Please review the draft for May's report

[Leo Wandersleb]

> Bernhard's point is that if Alice has a PGP trust path to a hash value
> [e.g., if Bob signed some hash value and Alice trusts Bob's key], has
> a file whose hash is that value, and the hash function is sufficiently
> strong, then Alice may trust that file as well, _regardless of its
> origin_.
>
> That's just the standard property of signatures.  If you're on a plane
> and someone hands you a signed message that verifies to be from
> a trusted key, then you can trust the message is from that key's owner
> even if you don't trust whoever handed you the message.
Sure but I found it confusing in combination with the quorum logic. If I trust
my 12 sock puppets, I can reach any quorum that only requires 5 signatures. Some
slightly stronger concept of identity is needed if you go by a logic that says
"at least 2 trustworthy rebuilders have to sign" so you don't fall vulnerable to
wrench attacks.

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