[Git][reproducible-builds/reproducible-website][master] 2020-05: Fix copy-pasto, sentence fragment, grammar, mismatched delimiters, and spelling.

[Daniel Shahaf]

Daniel Shahaf pushed to branch master at Reproducible Builds / reproducible-website


Commits:
f19a0b77 by Daniel Shahaf at 2020-06-04T04:16:59+00:00
2020-05: Fix copy-pasto, sentence fragment, grammar, mismatched delimiters, and spelling.

- - - - -


1 changed file:

- _reports/2020-05.md


Changes:

=====================================
_reports/2020-05.md
=====================================
@@ -6,30 +6,30 @@ title: "Reproducible Builds in May 2020"
 draft: true
 ---
 
-**Welcome to the April 2020 report from the [Reproducible Builds]({{ "/" | relative_url }}) project.** In our regular reports we outline the most important things that we and the rest of the community have been up to over the past month.
+**Welcome to the May 2020 report from the [Reproducible Builds]({{ "/" | relative_url }}) project.** In our regular reports we outline the most important things that we and the rest of the community have been up to over the past month.
 {: .lead}
 
 [![]({{ "/images/reports/2020-05/reproducible-builds.png#right" | relative_url }})]({{ "/" | relative_url }})
 
-One of the original promises of open source software is that distributed peer review and transparency of process results in enhanced end-user security. But whilst anyone may inspect the source code of free and open source software for malicious flaws, almost all software today is distributed as pre-compiled binaries. This allows nefarious third-parties to compromise systems by injecting malicious code into seemingly secure software during the various compilation and distribution processes.
+One of the original promises of open source software is that distributed peer review and transparency of process results in enhanced end-user security. Nonetheless, whilst anyone may inspect the source code of free and open source software for malicious flaws, almost all software today is distributed as pre-compiled binaries. This allows nefarious third-parties to compromise systems by injecting malicious code into seemingly secure software during the various compilation and distribution processes.
 
 ## News
 
-The [Corona-Warn](https://www.coronawarn.app/en/) app that helps trace infection chains of SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19) in Germany had a [feature request filed against it that it builds reproducibly](https://github.com/corona-warn-app/cwa-documentation/issues/14).
+The [Corona-Warn](https://www.coronawarn.app/en/) app that helps trace infection chains of SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 in Germany had a [feature request filed against it that it build reproducibly](https://github.com/corona-warn-app/cwa-documentation/issues/14).
 
-A number of academics from [Cornell University](https://www.cornell.edu/) have published a paper title [*Backstabber's Knife Collection*](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.09535),  review of open source software supply chain attacks:
+A number of academics from [Cornell University](https://www.cornell.edu/) have published a paper titled [*Backstabber's Knife Collection*](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.09535),  reviewing open source software supply chain attacks:
 
 > Recent years saw a number of supply chain attacks that leverage the increasing use of open source during software development, which is facilitated by dependency managers that automatically resolve, download and install hundreds of open source packages throughout the software life cycle.
 
 In related news, the [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/) Android distribution announced that a [hacker had access to the infrastructure of their servers](https://twitter.com/LineageAndroid/status/1256821056100163584) after exploiting an unpatched vulnerability.
 
-Marcin Jachymiak of the [Sia](https://sia.tech/) decentralised cloud storage platform posted on their blog that their `siac` and `siad` utitilies can now be built reproducibly:
+Marcin Jachymiak of the [Sia](https://sia.tech/) decentralised cloud storage platform posted on their blog that their `siac` and `siad` utilities can now be built reproducibly:
 
 > This means that anyone can recreate the same binaries produced from our official release process. Now anyone can verify that the release binaries were created using the source code we say they were created from. No single person or computer needs to be trusted when producing the binaries now, which greatly reduces the attack surface for Sia users.
 
 [Synchronicity](https://github.com/iqlusioninc/synchronicity) is a distributed build system for [Rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/) artifacts which have been published to [crates.io](https://crates.io/). The goal of *Synchronicity* is to provide a [distributed binary](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency) transparency system which is independent of any central operator.
 
-The [*Comparison of Linux distributions*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_Linux_distributions)" article Wikipedia article now features a *Reproducible Builds* indicating whether distributions approach and progress towards achieving reproducible builds.
+The [*Comparison of Linux distributions*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_Linux_distributions) article Wikipedia article now features a *Reproducible Builds* column indicating whether distributions approach and progress towards achieving reproducible builds.
 
 
 <br>



View it on GitLab: https://salsa.debian.org/reproducible-builds/reproducible-website/-/commit/f19a0b7738afa1b90bd7805e8529c434666edbe9

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